

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 191571

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM MBFR VIENNA DATED JULY 22, 1976
SENT SECSTATE WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC INFO NATO, BONN,
LONDON, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR IS REPEATED TO YOU:
QUOTE

O N F I D E N T I A L MBFR VIENNA 0411

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS APPROVED BY AD HOC
GROUP FOR JULY 21 END-OF-ROUND PRESS CONFERENCE

BELOW IS TEXT OF PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS APPROVED BY AD
HOC GROUP IN ITS SESSION OF JULY 20 IN PREPARATION FOR JULY 21
END-OF-ROUND PRESS CONFERENCE BY NETHERLANDS REP. WE ARE SENDING
THIS MATERIAL TELEGRAPHICALLY BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THE DATA ISSUE MAY IN SOME FORM BE RAISED BY WESTERN JOURNALISTS
IN THE COMING DAYS IN ORDER TO INFORM OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON
AND ADDRESSEE POSTS OF THE GUIDELINES APPROVED BY AD HOC
GROUP FOR ITS OWN USE ON THESE ISSUES.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. Q. THE EAST HAS NOW TABLED DATA. WHAT IS THE WESTERN REACTION
TO THIS DATA?

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A. BY AGREEMENT, THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL, THEREFORE,
I CANNOT COMMENT ON THE DATA IN DETAIL. I CAN SAY (1) THAT THERE
ARE IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN OUR DATA AND THE DATA TABLED
BY THE EAST, (2) THAT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR TO US WHAT BASIS THE

EAST HAS USED FOR COMPUTING ITS DATA, AND (3) THAT WE EXPECT TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS TO CLARIFY THE REASONS FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES.

2. Q. ISN'T IT A POSITIVE FACT THAT THE EAST HAS AT LEAST TABLED SOME DATA?

A. YES, ALTHOUGH THIS STEP IS LONG OVERDUE. IT DOES NOT OF COURSE REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH.

3. Q. YOU MAINTAIN THAT EASTERN DATA ARE INCORRECT. DOES THAT MEAN THE EAST HAS DISTORTED THESE FIGURES?

A. I AM SAYING THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN OUR DATA AND THE EAST'S DATA. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR DATA ARE CORRECT. THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCIES WILL NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AND MADE CLEAR.

4. Q. THE EAST MAINTAINS THAT YOUR DATA FOR NATO FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA ARE INCOMPLETE, THAT THEY ONLY COVER GROUND FORCES.

A. THIS IS NOT QUITE CORRECT. WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE EAST THAT WE THINK THE AIR MANPOWER TOTALS ARE ROUGHLY EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES. OUR DEC 16 PROPOSALS INDICATED THE GENERAL SIZE OF THE TOTAL AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE.

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

SINCE WE DO NOT PROPOSE THAT OUR AIR FORCE MANPOWER BE REDUCED, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LEVEL SUGGESTED FOR THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING AND THAT SUGGESTED FOR THE GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING PROVIDES A ROUGH FIGURE FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER. WE SUGGESTED THESE LEVELS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR DEC 16 PROPOSALS, WHICH INCLUDED A PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE COMMON CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THOUGH WITHOUT REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER.
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5. Q. THE EAST HAS ASKED FOR WESTERN DATA ON NATO FORCES. WHEN WILL THESE BE SUPPLIED?

A. A REPLY WILL BE MADE IN DUE COURSE.

6. Q. ARE WESTERN DATA TABLED 2 1/2 YEARS AGO STILL VALID?

A. IN OUR ASSESSMENT THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR FLUCTUATIONS IN THE MANPOWER LEVELS OF BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. Q. YOU SAY THAT THE IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN DATA TABLED BY THE EAST AND DATA TABLED BY THE WEST WILL HAVE TO BE

DISCUSSED. WHAT DOES THAT INVOLVE?

A. I CANNOT GO INTO ANY DETAILS ON CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS. BUT IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES EXIST BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN DATA. THE REASONS FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES WILL NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AND CLARIFIED. ONE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES HAVE BEEN COMPUTED ON A COMPARABLE BASIS.

8. Q. EASTERN DATA FIGURES HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS. ARE THESE CORRECT?

A. I WILL NOT ADDRESS ANY DETAILS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE QUESTION OF DATA. BUT AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES EXIST BETWEEN DATA TABLED BY THE WEST AND BY THE EAST.

9. Q. ISN'T IT A FACT THAT THE EASTERN DATA INDICATE THAT THERE IS A MILITARY BALANCE AFTER ALL?

A. AS I HAVE INDICATED, THERE ARE IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WESTERN DATA AND THE TABLED EASTERN DATA. WESTERN DATA SHOW THAT WHEN ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ARE COUNTED, THE EAST HAS A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITATIVE SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THE EAST ALSO HAS A GREATER NUMBER OF TANKS.

10. Q. DID THE FIGURES ON WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, TABLED CONFIDENTIAL

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BY THE WEST IN NOVEMBER 1973, INCLUDE FRENCH FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS?

A. YES.

11. Q. WILL THE FRENCH BE INCLUDED IN FORTHCOMING WESTERN DATA?

A. WHEN WE TABLE IT, OUR DATA WILL BE ACCURATE AND UP TO DATE.

12. CONTINGENCY IN CASE EAST RELEASES ACTUAL DATA.

Q. ACCORDING TO THE EASTERN FIGURES WHICH HAVE BEEN RELEASED, THE WEST HAS EXTENSIVELY OVERESTIMATED THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA. DO YOU AGREE THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE? IF SO, DOES THAT NOT DESTROY THE WESTERN CASE FOR UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS?

A. NO. OUR OWN DATA CONTINUE TO SHOW THAT THERE IS A LARGE DESTABILIZING GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT, THERE ARE IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN TABLED WESTERN AND EASTERN DATA. WE WILL HAVE TO DISCUSS THE REASONS FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES. IT MAY WELL TURN OUT THAT

THE DATA HAVE NOT BEEN COMPUTED ON A COMPARABLE BASIS BY BOTH SIDES. WHILE THIS DISCUSSION GOES ON, I DO NOT WANT TO COMMENT ANY FURTHER ON EASTERN DATA.

13. CONTINGENCIES IN CASE FRENCH POSITION ON DATA LEAKS:

Q. DID WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SAY THAT THE COMMON CEILING LIMITATION SHOULD COVER THESE FRENCH FORCES.

A. WE TOLD THE EAST THAT IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

Q. IS IT TRUE THAT FRANCE IS DELAYING TABLING OF WESTERN FIGURES IN THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS?

A. IN RESPONSE TO TABLING OF DATA BY THE EAST
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AND THE EAST'S REQUEST FOR WESTERN FIGURES, WE HAVE TOLD THE EAST THAT WE WOULD GIVE THEM OUR REPLY IN DUE COURSE. I HAVE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

14. Q. ARE THE FRENCH MAKING DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS?

A. AS YOU KNOW, THE FRENCH ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT ON FRENCH VIEWS.

15. Q. THE EAST REPEATEDLY COMPLAINS THAT THE WEST HAS SO FAR NOT RESPONDED TO ITS PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 19. WHY IS THAT?

-. WE HAVE OF COURSE ADDRESSED THE FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL ON MANY OCCASIONS. HOWEVER, THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT MOVE IN OUR DIRECTION. THE EAST IS STILL INSISTING, AS IT HAS FROM THE OUTSET, ON EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BY EACH INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANT. AND THE EAST IS STILL INSISTING THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ALL OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, INCLUDING TO EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS, BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS AT ALL TAKE PLACE.

16. Q. THE EAST REPEATEDLY ACCUSES THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF BEING UNWILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE. IS THAT A FACT?

A. NO. THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A GENERAL COMMITMENT IN A SATISFACTORY

FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. IN THE COURSE OF MORE
THAN 2 YEARS, THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE OFFERED A NUMBER
OF OTHER COMMITMENTS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,
INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING; (1) THEY HAVE PROVIDED AN
INDICATION OF THE OVERALL DIMENSION OF REDUCTIONS
IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THE WEST IS PREPARED TO TAKE
IN PHASE II. (2) THEY HAVE STATED THAT ALL NON-US
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WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO
PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH
A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT. (3) THE WEST
HAS ALSO OFFERED ASSURANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE
TIMING OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FORM OF
COMMITMENTS TO AGREE ON A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME IN
WHICH PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN. THESE
STEPS SHOULD PROVIDE THE EAST REASONABLE ASSURANCES
ABOUT A SECOND PHASE.

WE ARE NOT WILL TO DROP OUR BASIC POSITION ON
PHASING, WHICH IS THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA WILL NOT TAKE FINAL
DECISIONS ON THE SCOPE, AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS
UNTIL AFTER THE EAST HAS AGREED TO A COMMON CEILING
ON MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA AND HAS TAKEN A
SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND
FORCES THROUGH WITHDRAWING A TANK ARMY.
WE THINK THIS REQUIREMENT IS FULLY JUSTIFIED BEFORE
NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKE THE BIG STEP
OF ENTERING A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WITH THE WARSAW
PACT TO REDUCE OUR FORCES.

17. Q. THE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE THE DECEMBER 16
U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTION OFFER. HASN'T THE EAST IN
EFFECT NOW REJECTED THIS OFFER?

A. THE OFFER IS STILL ON THE TABLE. THOUGH WE ARE DIS-
APPOINTED THAT THE EAST HAS SO FAR FAILED TO PROVIDE
AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE, WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS AND PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS IMPORTANT
PROPOSAL.

18. Q. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE RECENT NPG SESSION
AT BRUSSELS DECIDED TO WITHDRAW OBSOLETE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FROM EUROPE, OR TO IMPROVE THEM AND PUT THEM
INTO LESS VULNERABLE LOCATIONS. DOESN'T THAT MAKE
THE MILITARY VALUE OF YOUR DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL
QUESTIONABLE?

A. I DO NOT WANT TO DISCUSS NATO MINISTERIAL DELIBERATIONS

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IN DETAIL. THE US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SPECIFIED FOR WITHDRAWAL IN THE WESTERN DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY REDUCTION. THESE ARE NOT OBSOLETE SYSTEMS. THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IS OF GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE INTER ALIA BECAUSE IT WOULD RESULT IN A LIMITATION ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF ALL US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

19. Q. WON'T THE WESTERN REFUSAL TO LIMIT ALL BUT A VERY FEW SELECTED US ARMAMENTS PERMIT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE?

A. AS I POINTED OUT IN MY STATEMENT, THE WEST IS PREPARED TO LIMIT THE OVERALL TOTAL OF ALL US NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT US NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE AREA. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO LIMIT ALL ACTIVE DUTY NATO MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. FURTHER, WE BELIEVE THAT ACCEPTANCE BY THE EAST OF THE COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES WOULD EFFECTIVELY MINIMIZE INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE BECAUSE THERE WOULD THEN BE A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

20. Q. THE EAST FREQUENTLY CHARGES THAT NATO IS CONTINUING THE ARMS RACE. HAVE NATO FORCES BEEN INCREASED SINCE THE START OF THE TALKS?

A. THE LEVEL OF NATO MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR FLUCTUATIONS IN BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT MANPOWER LEVELS. ON THE WESTERN SIDE, STRUCTURAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT INCREASING MANPOWER LEVELS. AS FOR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, BOTH SIDES CONTINUE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

21. Q. HAVE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA BEEN INCREASED SINCE THE TALKS STARTED?

A. THE WARSAW PACT HAS BEEN MAKING QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
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IN ITS FORCES IN THE AREA AND CONTINUES TO DO SO. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR FLUCTUATIONS IN BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT MANPOWER LEVELS SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.

22. Q. WITH NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED THIS YEAR IN THE US AND IN THE FRG, CAN WE EXPECT THAT HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS?

A. I WOULD NOT EXPECT NATIONAL ELECTIONS TO INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE TWO WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH WILL HAVE ELECTIONS, THERE IS BROAD NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS AS AN ALLIANCE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH THE EAST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

23. Q. WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WESTERN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS OF WESTERN ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY PROPOSED?

A. WE CONSIDER THAT WHAT WE ARE ALREADY OFFERING THE EAST IS CLEARLY AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT WE ARE ASKING THE EAST TO DO. TO GO FURTHER WOULD CREATE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THE EAST.

24. Q. FORCE DEFINITION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED FOR SOME TIME. WAS THIS ISSUE DISCUSSED IN THIS ROUND AS WELL?

A. THE SUBJECT WAS NOT DISCUSSED DURING THIS ROUND. (IF PRESSED: IT IS HOWEVER STILL THE WESTERN VIEW THAT IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA AND ONLY SUCH PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN SUCH A FORCE DEFINITION.)

25. Q. WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS ROUND? (OR: HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROGRESS IN THIS ROUND?)

A. I HAVE SUMMED UP DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST ROUND IN CONFIDENTIAL

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MY STATEMENT AND POINTED TO WHAT IS NOW NEEDED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS. WE STILL LOOK FOR A SERIOUS AND POSITIVE EASTERN RESPONSE TO OUR DECEMBER 16 PROPOSALS.

END TEXT. RESOR

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